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        Executive Summary 
 
Despite the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the meeting of the parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in July 2001 has increased the likelihood that 
the Protocol will be ratified. This raises a number of issues concerning mitigation costs, 
particularly for the buyers and sellers of emission permits. In this paper, we examine how 
the US decision is likely to affect compliance costs for other Annex B countries during 
the first commitment period. We also explore the implications for US emissions. Key 
findings include: 
 
1.  Participating OECD countries may experience a decline in mitigation costs, but 
because of the banking provision contained in the Protocol, the decline may not 
be as great as some would suggest.  
 
2.  If the majority of “hot air” is concentrated in a small number of countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, these countries may be able to 
organize a sellers’ cartel and extract sizable economic rents; and 
 
3.  Even in the absence of mandatory emission reduction requirements, US emissions 
in 2010 may be lower than their business-as-usual baseline because of 
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 US Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol:    
The Impact on Compliance Costs and CO2 Emissions 
       




Despite the US rejection, the meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in July 2001
1 has increased the likelihood 
that the Kyoto Protocol
2 will be ratified by a sufficient number of Annex B countries to 
enter into force. This raises a number of issues concerning mitigation costs, particularly 
for the buyers and sellers of emission permits. In this paper, we examine how US non-
ratification is likely to affect compliance costs for other Annex B countries. We also 
explore the implications for US emissions. The results are summarized below. As with 
any such analysis, it is easy to quibble over the exact numbers. The real value lies more 
in the insights, rather than precise numerical values. 
 
•  Banking and hot air. In the absence of US ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
overall costs of mitigation may decline for other OECD countries during the first 
commitment period (2008-12). However, based on the results of the present 
analysis, the reduction in mitigation costs may not be as great as some would 
suggest. This is because the “banking” provision of the Protocol permits countries 
to defer the use of some portion of their emission rights in one period for use at a 
later time. Such flexibility is particularly important for some of the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. With the economic difficulties 
encountered during restructuring, their business-as-usual emissions in the first 
commitment period are apt to fall below 1990 levels.  
With banking, it appears to be in the interest of the owners of “hot air” to 
defer a substantial portion of their excess emission rights for later use. As a result, 
mitigation costs during the first commitment period for those OECD countries 
that adopt the Kyoto Protocol appear to be slightly lower than they would be with 
US ratification, but not nearly as low as they would be in the absence of banking. 
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US nonparticipation may be particularly costly to the owners of hot air since the 
decline in demand may result in a huge decline in permit prices.  
 
•  No banking and market power. In the above, we assume that the owners of hot 
air are price takers. That is, they are willing to sell all of their hot air during the 
first commitment period if banking is disallowed. However, if the majority of hot 
air is concentrated in a small number of countries, they may be able to organize a 
sellers’ cartel and extract sizable economic rents. As a result, they may be able to 
reduce substantially the negative impacts to their economies from US 
nonparticipation. This, of course, would be at the expense of participating OECD 
countries. 
•  Anticipatory behavior. Even in the absence of mandatory emission reduction 
requirements, US emissions in 2010 may be lower than expected. This is because 
energy-sector investments are typically long-lived. If investors believe that there 
may be mandatory reductions in the future, they will factor this consideration into 
near-term decision-making. Hence, although US emissions are projected to 
increase during the first decade of the 21
st century, they are expected to be below 
their business-as-usual baseline. Clearly, the scale of the near-term reductions will 
be sensitive to one’s expectations about the magnitude and nature of future 
requirements. 
 
We stress the preliminary nature of the present study. S ensitivity analysis is 
needed with regard to a number of potentially important parameters. These include GDP 
growth, the price and availability of new technologies, the potential for price and non-
price induced conservation, additional requirements for subsequent commitment periods, 
which countries would be involved, and so on.  
  Finally, these calculations are based upon the assumption that policies will be 
efficient. That is, market mechanisms will be chosen over “command and control” 
approaches to accomplishing environmental objectives. This is the assumption both 
domestically and internationally. To the extent that policies depart from market 
mechanisms (for example, the adoption of CAFE standards in the transport sector)
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mitigation costs could be considerably higher than those reported in this paper. Still, we 
believe that the qualitative insights will hold with regard to the value of banking, hot air, 
market power and anticipatory behavior. 
 
2. The MERGE Model 
 
  The analysis is based on MERGE (a model for evaluating the regional and global 
effects of greenhouse gas reduction policies). MERGE is an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model. The model assumes that investors correctly anticipate future targets 
and timetables. Uncertainty is treated through sensitivity analysis. Like its predecessors, 
the current version (MERGE 4.4) is designed to be sufficiently transparent so that one 
can explore the implications of alternative viewpoints in the greenhouse debate. It 
integrates submodels that provide a reduced-form description of the energy sector, the 
economy, emissions, concentrations, temperature change, and damage assessment.  
  MERGE combines a bottom-up representation of the energy supply sector 
together with a top-down perspective on the remainder of the economy. For a particular 
scenario, a choice is made among specific activities for the generation of electricity and 
for the production of non-electric energy. Oil, gas, and coal are viewed as exhaustible 
resources. There are introduction constraints on new technologies and decline constraints 
on old ones. MERGE also provides for endogenous technology diffusion. That is, the 
near-term adoption of high-cost carbon-free technologies leads to accelerated future 
introduction of lower cost versions of these technologies. 
  Outside the energy sector, the economy is modeled through nested constant 
elasticity production functions. The production functions determine how aggregate 
economic output depends upon the inputs of capital, labor, electric and non-electric 
energy. In this way, the model allows for both price-induced and autonomous (non-price) 
energy conservation and for interfuel substitution. Since there is a “putty-clay” 
formulation, short-run elasticities are smaller than long-run elasticities. This increases the 
costs of rapid short-run adjustments. The model also allows for macroeconomic 
feedbacks. Higher energy and/or environmental costs will lead to fewer resources 
available for current consumption and for investment in the accumulation of capital 
stocks.                                                                                                                                          4
  MERGE is calibrated to the year 2000. Future periods are modeled in 10-year 
intervals. Hence, the first commitment period is represented as 2010 in the model. 
Economic values are reported in US dollars of constant 1998 purchasing power. 
  The model divides the world into nine geopolitical regions: 1) the USA, 2) 
OECDE (Western Europe), 3) Japan, 4) CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), 5) 
EEFSU (Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union), 6) China, 7) India, 8) MOPEC 
(Mexico and OPEC) and, 9) ROW (the rest of world). Figure 1 shows baseline emissions 
for each of the nine regions. Based on the assumptions underlying the analysis, it projects 
how emissions would grow  in the absence of policies and measures to reduce CO2 
emissions. Note that the countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (Regions 1 through 4) together with the economies 
in transition (Region 5) constitute Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
a 
  Each of the model’s regions maximizes the discounted utility of its consumption 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Each region’s wealth includes not only 
capital, labor, and exhaustible resources, but also its negotiated international share in 
emission rights. Particularly relevant for the present calculations, MERGE provides a 
general equilibrium formulation of the global economy. We model international trade in 
emission rights, allowing regions with high marginal abatement costs to purchase 
emission rights from regions with low marginal abatement costs. There is also trade in 
oil, gas, and energy-intensive goods. International capital flows are endogenous, but the 
model is calibrated so that these flows will be small. 
  For more on the model, see our web site: http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/ 
 
3. Focus of the Analysis 
 
  With an intertemporal general equilibrium model, it is necessary to make assumptions 
not only about the first commitment period, but also about subsequent periods. For 
illustrative purposes, we assume that Kyoto will be followed with a subsequent protocol in 
which all Annex B countries agree to reduce emissions by an additional 10% per decade 
starting in 2020. For the US, the constraint in 2020 is assumed to be the same as if it had 
                                                                 
 
a  Figure 1 highlights the importance of international cooperation in reducing CO2 emissions. Even if Annex 
B countries were to reduce emissions to zero, global emissions would continue to grow in the absence of 
emission reductions on the part of developing countries.                                                                                                                                         5
adopted the Kyoto Protocol. Clearly, the nature and timing of future constraints are highly 
speculative and need to be subjected to extensive sensitivity analysis.  
  Table 1 describes the distinguishing characteristics of our initial set of cases. In Case 
1, we make the counterfactual assumption that all Annex B countries (including the US) 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. We further assume full trade in emission rights both within and 
across Annex B countries. In Case 2, the US does not adopt mandatory targets and timetables 
until 2020. Accordingly, we assume that it does not participate in international trade in 
emission rights until that year. The final distinguishing characteristic of Case 2 is that the 
banking of emission rights is prohibited. That is, countries are not allowed to defer the use of 
some portion of their emission rights in one period for use at a later time. Case 3 differs from 
Case 2 in that the banking of emission rights is permitted. 
 
Table 1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Three Cases 
 









Case 1  All Annex B 
countries 









Case 2  All Annex B 
countries with 
the exception of 
the US 










2020 for the US. 
Not permitted* 
Case 3  All Annex B 
countries with 
the exception of 
the US 





period for Annex 




2020 for the US. 
Permitted 
* Banking is permitted under the Kyoto Protocol. Cases 2 and 3 are designed to assess 
the value of this provision to various regions.                                                                                                                                         6
 
  Although CO2 is the most important of the manmade greenhouse gases
4, the Kyoto 
Protocol includes a number of other trace gases. The focus of the present analysis is 
exclusively on CO2. Although inclusion of the other gases may raise or lower absolute costs, 
depending upon the shape of their marginal abatement cost curves, we do not believe that it 
would alter the general insights from the analysis. 
We do, however, include carbon sink enhancement. Table 2 shows the values 
adopted for each of the five Annex B regions. To provide some perspective, in order for 
the US to reduce carbon emissions by 7% below 1990 levels in 2010, it would have to 
reduce emissions by approximately 600 million tons below its baseline trajectory. Sink 
enhancement would satisfy less than 10% of this obligation. For purposes of the present 
analysis, we assume sink enhancement is costless. Clearly, an important next step would 
be to incorporate supply curves for sink enhancement. 
 
Table 2. Sink Enhancement (million metric tons of carbon annually)
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  50 
  6 
  13 
  19 
  27 
 
 
We also allow for emission credits through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). In calculating the potential size of the contribution from the CDM, we first 
calculate the magnitude of the imports from non-Annex B countries if there were full 
global trading and if these countries were limited to their baseline carbon emissions. 
However, because of the difficulties in implementation, we assume that only 15% of the 




4. The Importance of Banking and Hot Air 
 
The Kyoto Protocol sets limits on aggregate greenhouse gas emissions for Annex 
B countries for the first commitment period. For several countries, these limits are                                                                                                                                         7
projected to exceed their actual emissions. In particular, the decline in economic activity 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) during the 1990’s has led to a 
decrease in their carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, this region is projected to have 
excess emission rights. In the parlance of the climate debate this is commonly described 
as “hot air” or “Russian hot air” to denote the country expected to receive the largest 
number of excess credits. The Protocol permits these rights to be sold to countries in 
search of low-cost options for meeting their own targets or to be “banked” for use at a 
later date. In this section, we examine the implications of banking and hot air. 
Figure 2 shows baseline emissions and the emissions constraint for EEFSU. In 
2010, domestic emissions are beneath the cap. EEFSU’s excess credits exceed 300 
million tons. However, with economic growth and a further tightening of the emissions 
constraint, the cap becomes binding by 2020. It is debatable how the excess permits 
generated during the first commitment period might be distributed over time. The answer 
will vary across the three cases described in Table 1. 
Figure 3 shows how the hot air is allocated based upon the assumptions 
underlying the present analysis. Perhaps most important is the assumption that EEFSU 
will behave as a price taker.
b In Case 1, most of the hot air is sold during the first 
commitment period. If all Annex B countries were to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the 
demand for emission rights would be high, and only a small amount of the hot air is 
banked for subsequent use. In Cases 2 and 3, the US chooses not to adopt mandatory 
targets and timetables until 2020. With banking disallowed, EEFSU will have no 
alternative but to sell all of its hot air during the first commitment period. Conversely, if 
EEFSU is able to defer the sale of its excess permits until 2020, most of its hot air is 
carried forward for use at that time. 
Figure 4 shows the international price of permits. In Cases 1 and 3 where banking 
is allowed, the permit price rises at approximately the marginal product of capital, 5% per 
year, between 2010 and 2020. The intertemporal allocation of the hot air ensures that this 
is the case. 
                                                                 
 
b  In Section 7, we explore a scenario in which EEFSU is able to exert market power with regard to the sale 
of hot air.                                                                                                                                         8
Case 2 shows the international price of emission rights when banking is 
prohibited. The demand for emission rights in 2010 is reduced because of US 
nonparticipation in the Protocol. On the supply side, all of the hot air is available since its 
use cannot be deferred to a subsequent period. As a result, the value of the hot air is quite 
small. The situation is reversed in 2020. Demand for permits increases dramatically with 
the US adopting mandatory targets and timetables in 2020. There is a tightening of the 
Annex B constraints and there is also the absence of hot air. Hence, the price of permits 
rises sharply. 
 
5. GDP Losses 
 
  We next turn to the issue of GDP losses. Here, we feel it is important to restate 
the earlier caveat. The analysis is based on the assumption that policies will be efficient. 
That is, we assume that market mechanisms will be chosen over “command and control” 
approaches to accomplishing environmental objectives. To the extent that we depart from 
market mechanisms, mitigation costs could easily be much higher 
Figure 5 shows percentage GDP losses in 2010 for each region. We begin with 
OECD Europe (OECDE). Notice that their losses decline when the US does not 
participate in the first commitment period. Moreover, their losses decline dramatically 
when banking is prohibited. This is consistent with a very low price for permits.  
When banking is permitted, as it is in the Kyoto Protocol, the decline is less steep. 
With much of the hot air deferred for later use, permit prices are only slightly lower than 
in Case 1. Note that the same is true for Japan and CANZ. Hence, it seems that contrary 
to conventional wisdom, US nonparticipation in the first commitment period does not 
substantially lower mitigation costs for the remaining OECD countries. 
In terms of mitigation costs, EEFSU is negatively affected by US nonparticipation 
in the first commitment period. In Case 2, the price of permits plummets. There is a 
decline in demand coupled with a large supply of hot air available for sale in that period. 
In Case 3, most of the hot air i s banked for use in subsequent periods. Again, this 
negatively impacts EEFSU in 2010. 
If the US were to adopt the Kyoto Protocol, its losses are estimated to be of the 
order of three-quarters of one percent of GDP in 2010. We stress that this assumes full 
Annex B trading both among and within countries. These numerical results are consistent                                                                                                                                         9
with a number of studies conducted over the last several years.
6 Interestingly, the US also 
incurs GDP losses in 2010 even when it faces no mandatory constraints in that year 





MERGE incorporates the effect of anticipatory behavior on the part of investors. 
Given the long-lived nature of many energy-sector investments, e.g., transport, buildings 
and power plants, the anticipation of significant emission constraints in the future will 
affect near-term decision-making––even if no mandatory constraints are in place for that 
period. For example, in Cases 2 and 3 we assume that m andatory constraints will be 
placed on US emissions beginning in 2020. The positive US losses reported for 2010 
reflect the fact that, in preparation for a less carbon-intensive infrastructure in the future, 
energy-sector investors are making more costly investments than would be made in the 
absence of concerns about future constraints on CO2 emissions. 
If the US were to adopt the Kyoto Protocol, it would have to reduce emissions by 
600 million tons in 2010. We calculate that roughly half of this requirement would result 
from reductions in domestic CO2 emissions. Carbon sinks and the import of emission 
rights would account for the remainder. Figure 6 compares domestic emission reductions 
if the US were to ratify the Kyoto Protocol with reductions due solely to anticipatory 
behavior. With regard to the latter, we examine two cases. In Case 2, EEFSU is 
prohibited from banking its excess emission rights. In Case 3 it is not. Notice that the 
anticipation of mandatory targets in 2020 result in domestic reductions in 2010. 
Also notice that anticipatory reductions are higher when banking is prohibited. 
This is due to the absence of hot air in 2020. In that year, the US will be able to offset 
less of its obligation through the purchase of emission rights. As a result, it must rely 
more heavily on domestic emission reductions in 2020. Anticipating this in 2010, 
investors will begin adapting to the tighter future constraints. Clearly, the scale of the 
                                                                 
c  We note that the issue of anticipatory behavior does not apply solely to the US, but to any country facing 
the prospects of emission reductions in the future. Indeed, the prospect of economic growth coupled with 
an increasingly tighter emissions constraint, contributes to the magnitude of the losses to EFFSU in 2010 
in Cases 2 and 3.                                                                                                                                         10
near-term reductions will be sensitive to one’s expectations about the magnitude and 
nature of future requirements. 
 
7. Market Power  
 
Thus far, we have assumed that, in the absence of banking, the sellers of emission 
rights will be price takers. That is, they will be willing to sell all of their hot air during the 
first commitment period. However, if the majority of the hot air is concentrated in a small 
number of countries, these countries may be able to organize a sellers’ cartel and extract 
sizable economic rents.  
To explore this possibility, we assume that EEFSU is a price maker, and is able to 
limit the amount of hot air available for sale to other Annex B countries during the first 
commitment period. Figure 7 illustrates how percentage GDP losses to EEFSU might 
change if it were able to control the amount of hot air sold. Notice that losses are 
minimized when the sale of hot air is limited to somewhere between 120 and 160 million 
tons. Figure 8 shows the impact, in terms of percentage GDP losses, when EEFSU limits 
sales of hot air to 140 million tons in 2010 (Case 2a). The participating OECD countries 
experience losses comparable to those of Case 1. Conversely, relative to Case 2, the 
losses to EEFSU decline significantly. 
 
8. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we examined how the US decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol is 
likely to affect compliance costs for the remaining Annex B countries during the first 
commitment period. In the case of other OECD countries, compliance costs may decline, 
but perhaps not as much as some have suggested. In the case of the economies in 
transition, compliance costs are likely to increase. Although we believe that the basic 
insights are likely to hold, more analysis is required to explore the sensitivity of the 
results to changes in key assumptions. The following issues, not explored in the present 
analysis, also need to be examined: 
 
•  Suppose that in order to entice other countries into joining a future Protocol, they too 
are accorded hot air. What would be the impact on the value of emission permits in                                                                                                                                         11
subsequent periods? How would this affect the willingness of the current owners of 
hot air to defer the sale of their excess emission rights? 
 
•  We assume that the US will not partake in international trade in emission rights until 
it adopts mandatory targets. How realistic is this assumption? What would be the 
implications if the US were to act otherwise? 
 
•  We assume that countries will correctly anticipate future constraints. Clearly, there is 
a strong likelihood of future constraints on CO2 emissions. But what constraints do 
we assume? One way to handle this uncertainty is through sensitivity analyses. A 
better way would be to employ the techniques of decision analysis and identify the 
optimal near-term hedging strategy in the face of the many long-term uncertainties.
7 
 
•  Finally, with regard to near-term emission reductions, how well does the current 
proposal fit into the ultimate goal of the Framework Convention, “the stabilization of 
greenhouse concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”
8? A great deal of effort has been devoted to 
identifying the least-cost emission pathways for stabilizing concentrations at various 
levels. This work suggests that the pathway to stabilization can be as important as the 
stabilization level itself in determining mitigation costs. Are the reductions mandated 
under the Kyoto Protocol consistent with the long-term goals of the Framework 
Convention?                                                                                                                                         12
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Figure 2. Excess Emission Rights (“Hot Air”) in 
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Figure 3. Exports of “Hot Air” in 2010 from Eastern Europe 
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Figure 6. US Domestic Emission Reductions in 2010
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Figure 7. Percentage GDP Losses for EEFSU -- assuming 





Figure 8. Percentage GDP Losses in 2010 -- with EEFSU as 
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